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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS G. HURST and 
LOUISE V. HURST, his wife 
-vs-
Plaintiffs. 
I LED 
MAY 2 5 1964 
THE STATE OF UTAH, operating ____ ·c{j~~h%~-i6ji~gut~-h---
by and through the Department 
of Highways, and ROBERT B. 
BURGRAFF CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, Defendants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth District Court 
of Utah County 
HON. R. L. TUCKETT, Judge 
Jackson B. Howard and 
Jerry G. Thorn, for 
Howard and Lewis 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH S. KNOWLTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
STATE OF UTAH 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
Allomeys for Appellants 
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I~ ~rHE SUPREME COURT 
OF '"fHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TH()~L\S G. HURST and 
L()l~ISE \ 1. HURST, his wife 
-vs-
Plaintiffs. 
THE s·r.\TE OF UTAH, operating 
by and through the Department 
of Higlnvays, and ROBERT B. 
BURGRAFF CONSTRUCTION 
CO~IP.\0JY, Defendants. 
Case No. 10,089 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE~IENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint two causes of action: 
( 1) That Defendant State of Utah owns a gravel pit next 
door to plaintiffs' home and that said gravel pit is operated 
by Defendant Burgraff Construction Company; that the 
use of the gravel pit is damaging plaintiffs' property and 
that defendants should be restrained from using the gravel 
pit. (2) That defendant's operation has been willful and 
negligent, and unskilled, and creates a nuisance. There-
fore, plaintiffs ask for compensatory damage of $25,000.00 
and punitive damage of $25,000.00. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT 
Defendant State of Utah made a Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiffs, complaint on the grounds that the court did not 
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2 
have jurisdiction over the Defendant State of Utah, the 
State being immune from this type of action and had not 
consented to be sued. The Defendant, Robert B. Burgraff 
Construction Company moved to dismiss and in the alter-
native to strike the part of plaintiff's complaint dealing with 
punitive damages. The District Court granted Defendant 
State of Utah its Motion to Dismiss as to the State, and 
denied Defendant Burgraff Construction Company's Mo-
tion to Dismiss as to it, but granted its Motion to Strike the 
provision as to punitive damages. The Defendant Robert 
Burgraff Construction Company filed its Answer. Plaintiffs 
brought this appear from the Lower Court's Order dis-
missing the complaint against the State of Utah. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek to have the Lower Court's Order dis-
missing the complaint against the State of Utah reversed 
and the State of Utah re-instated as a party defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Respondent agrees with the first two paragraphs of 
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts and can amplify them some-
what. 
The gravel pit has been owned by the State since 1959, 
and consists of approximately 48 acres. This pit is situated 
near several other gravel pits, and has been in fairly con-
stant use since it was acquired. The State does not operate 
the property, but merely makes it available to contractors 
for their use in the construction of highways. 
The Robert Burgraff Construction Company has re-
moved approximately 106,000 cubic yards of material from 
this site as of September, 1963. 
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The area is zoned by city ordinance as a residential area, 
but stipulates that sand, clay or gravel may be removed. 
Respondent does not know about the facts stated in the 
third paragraph of appellants' Statement of Facts, but for 
the purposes of this appeal assumes them to be so. 
As to the fourth paragraph, the State does contemplate 
the continued lawful use of its property for the purposes for 
\vhich it was acquired; but does not attempt to draw the 
legal conclusion that said operation is a nuisance as felt by 
appellants in their brief, but not alleged by appellants in 
their complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFS' COM-
PLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY HAS 
~0 JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Section 27-12-9, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, reads as 
follows: 
"By its name the commission may sue, and it may be sued only on 
\vritten contracts made by it or under its authority." 
It is a \veil recognized rule that the State is immune from 
suit for damages without legislative consent. See Wilkinson 
:·.State, 42 Ut. 483, 134 Pac. 626 ( 1913) ; State vs. Fourth 
District Court, 94 Ut. 384, 98 P.2d 502 ( 1937); Campbell 
Building Co. vs. State Road Commission, 95 Ut. 242, 70 
P.2d 853 ( 1937) ; Bingham v. Board of Education, 118 Ut. 
582, 232 P.2d 432; Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Ut. 324, 
241 P.2d 907 ( 1952) ; State vs. Tedesco, 4 Ut. 2d 31, 286 
P.2d 15 ( 1955); ]opes vs. Salt Lake County, 9 Ut. 2d 297, 
2-!3 P.2d 728 ( 1959); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 
10 l.Jt. 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 ( 1960); Fairclough vs. Salt 
Lake County, et al, 10 Ut. 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 ( 1960); 
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State Road Commission vs. joseph A. Parker, et al, 368 
P.2d 585 ( 1962). 
This doctrine was also apparently recognized by the 
appellants in this action in that they indicate that they have 
dismissed their claim, or cause of action, wherein they were 
asking for damages against the State of Utah, leaving their 
prayer as they state for relief restricted to injunction. This 
contention will be argued later. 
It is also fairly well settled that the State cannot be en-
joined by the courts for consequential damages. This theory 
was set forth particularly in the case of State vs. Fourth Dis-
trict Court, supra, in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin 
the State Road Commission from constructing a viaduct 
until plaintiff was compensated for damages, because of the 
interference, or alleged interference, with air, light and 
view, and access. The court held: 
"The State Road Commission is an agency of the State ... Being an 
unincorporated agency of the State, a suit against it is a suit against 
the State. The State cannot be sued unless it has given its consent 
or waived its immunity. Defendants do not argue in their briefs 
that consent has been given by the State, or that there has been 
any waiver of the State's immunity from suit. Their argument is 
that the injunction suit is not against the State. We cannot agree 
with this argument insofar as the Road Commission as such is con-
cerned. It is an agency of the State, and a suit against it is a suit 
against the State." 
Much of what was said in the Fourth District Court 
case, supra, has been reversed in later decisions. See H jorth 
v. Whittenburg and Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton, 
supra, but the pronouncement of the court regarding im-
munity of the State from an injunction proceeding, in re-
gard to this type of action, has not been reversed and stands 
as a clear statement of the rule in this jurisdiction. 
Justice Wolfe amplified the rule when he stated that: 
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.. ~t'ithcr the Road Commission nor the individual Commissioners 
could be restrained from inflicting consequential damages." 
( Hjorth v. Whittenburg, supra). 
The rule about injunctions against consequential dam-
ages, set forth in the Fourth District Court case, was re-
cently affirmed in the case of the Springville Banking Co. 
vs. Burton, supra, wherein the plaintiff attempted by man-
damus to require members of the Road Commission to 
compensate alleged damages resulting from highway con-
sttuction. Our Court stated: 
( 1) "Can plaintiff, employing the extraordinary writ of manda-
mus, compel the state or pay damages when because of sov-
ereign immunity, it could not have done so in a direct suit 
against the State or the Road Commission? 
"We believe and hold that the procedure chosen by Plaintiff 
was an effort indirectly to do that which repeatedly we have 
held could not be done directly, which is dispositive of this 
case on that ground." (Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton, 
supra). 
l\Iandamus in this case was referred to as an injunctive pro-
ceeding. 
The appellants in the present action claim that these 
cases are not applicable to the present situation in that this 
is not a suit for consequential damages, but is a suit to en-
join a nuisance. It is the respondent's contention that this 
is just another attempt by appellants to try to do indirectly 
\vhat this court has held continually could not be done 
directly. There is no question but what the State can be 
enjoined in regard to a direct taking when they take a piece 
of property without compensation. To allow a party to 
bring an action for an injunction in the circumstances in the 
present case, is to allow a party to bring an action for a con-
sequential damage for the facts alleged by appellants are 
not such that \vould indicate anything but a consequential 
damage. 
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How do you distinguish between nuisance and a con-
sequential damage? What definitive terms can be utilized 
to distinguish between a damage to property, when no part 
thereof is taken, or a damage to property by reason of an 
alleged nuisance? This court, in the case of Springville 
Banking Co. vs. Burton, supra, in answer to one of the ques-
tions, propounded to itself in regard to this case, wherein 
the Road Commission placed a concrete island in the mid-
dle of the main street eliminating "U" turns and "left" 
turns to plaintiff's property, the following question: 
(2) "Was the damage here compensable in any event? ... As to 
( 2) : In this era of the freeway, citizens must yield to the 
common weal, albeit injury to their property may result. 
We espouse the notion that if the sovereign exercises its 
police power reasonably and for the good of all the people, 
when constructing highways, consequential damages such 
as those alleged here, are not compensable. On the other 
hand, if public officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably, 
causing, for example, total destruction of the means to get 
in and out of one's property, without any reasonable justi-
fication for doing so in the public interest, in a manner that 
imposes a special burden on one not shared by the public 
generally, principles of equity no doubt could be invoked to 
prevent threatened action of such character or to remove 
any instrumentality born of such conduct. Plaintiff did not 
allege or assert anything akin thereto." 
Justice Henroid in his answer to Justice Wade's dissent, 
in regard to the Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton case, 
concludes by the statement: 
"The United States, since its creation, and the State of Utah, ever 
since its creation, have never permitted the government to be sued 
without its consent. This is true whether property is taken for a 
public use without just compensation or whether the governm~nt 
decides to renege on a contract or obligation. Sovereign immunity 
is so ingrained in our system of jurisprudence that no case can be 
found where the government of the United States or the State of 
Utah was allowed to be sued by implied consent or otherwise for a 
taking or damaging of property for public use without compensa-
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tion. There is no distinction in principle as it related to the United 
Stltes or the State of Utah." 
The question then presents itself- is the type of dam-
age, as alleged in the present action, that which indicates 
public official acts which are arbitrary and unreasonable, 
and '"ithout any reasonable justification in the public in-
terest, imposed in a manner that creates a special burden on 
one not shared by the public generally, which would allow 
a court of equity to invoke its jurisdiction to prevent this 
type of action? 
In the case of Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 Ut. 50, 
224 P.2d 1037 ( 1950), the court evidently found the type 
of action that it felt was within this category, and held that 
it \vas a nuisance and subject to injunction. It is the re-
spondent's contention that this case is not compelling upon 
the present case and is distinguishable from the instant situ-
ation-
( 1 ) The Shaw case was against the county and not 
against the state, and the court carefully confined its deci-
sion to situations involving municipalities. Not a single case 
is cited or argued in the decision regarding the State or its 
. 
agencies. 
(2) In the Shaw case the offensive use feared by reason 
of the gravel pit '''as the use to be made by the county and 
not a third party, and the only relief available was against 
the county. In the instant situation, the Highway Depart-
ment has simply obtained the gravel location and made it 
available to the contractor, and it is the contractor, as an 
independent contractor, who is actually using the site and 
committing the alleged offensive acts of which the plain-
tiffs complain. The appellants have an ~dequate legal 
remedy. and as such do not have the compelling necessity 
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for an injunctive-type proceeding. If Defendant Burgraff 
Construction Company is committing the acts, as alleged 
by the plaintiffs, such that the contractor is negligent or un-
skillful in the operation of the gravel pit, they have an ade-
quate legal remedy against the contractor ( 43 Am. Jur. par. 
83, p. 827), and it is apparent that the court has taken this 
into consideration in that the court did not grant the De-
fendant Burgraff Construction Company's Motion to Dis-
miss. And, at the present time the Defendant Burgraff Con-
struction Company has answered. 
( 3) The Shaw case was an aggravated situation where 
there were 87 owners in a highly developed residential area, 
and where there was no apparent adequate remedy at law. 
In the instant situation only a handful of owners live near 
this gravel operation, which has been operating for many, 
many years and only the plaintiffs complain. The fact situa-
tion between the Shaw case and the instant situation is not 
at all comparable. 
We are then faced with the problem of what is it exactly 
that the appellants are asking for? What relief do they want 
in their action? A careful analysis of their complaint indi-
cates that they have two causes of action stated: 
( 1) Based upon the defendants' utilization of the prop-
erty as a gravel pit; the fact that they are using it for mining 
and excavating; the fact they create noise; the fact that 
they utilize it early in the morning and late at night; the 
fact that great amounts of smoke and dust are generated 
and that the wind can convey it upon the plaintiffs' prop-
erty, and they claim that the stockpiling of materials is lo-
cated close to the plaintiffs' property and as such the wind 
can blow dust and debris upon the plaintiffs' property. In 
this regard they claim that this type of action damages them 
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to the extent that they need an order restraining the defend-
ants from the usc of their property as a gravel pit. It ap-
pears they base this request for the injunction totally upon 
the dan1ages that results to them from the operation of the 
gravel pit. 
( 2) In the second cause of action they rely upon the fact 
that the operations of the defendants have been willful and 
negligent, when the defendants were informed and notified 
of the objections of the plaintiffs', and that the acts and con-
duct of the defendants in the management of said property 
has been in such a negligent and unskillful manner as to 
constitute a nuisance injurious to the health, comfort and 
safety of the plaintiffs and the enjoyment of their premises. 
And, in that regard the plaintiffs ask for compensatory 
damages in the amount of $25,000.00 and ask for punitive 
damages in the amount of $25,000.00. 
Now, in their brief, appellants realizing that they cannot 
sue the State for damages have dismissed their claim for 
damages against the State of Utah leaving their prayer for 
relief restricted to injunction. Nowhere in their cause of 
action, "·herein they ask for an injunction, do they men-
tion the "·ord nuisance. The only relief or claim they have 
for their complaint is that of damages. And, in the cause 
of action, "·herein they claim a nuisance, nowhere do they 
ask for an injunction. The only claim for relief that they 
put forth is for a monetary damage. 
:\.ppellants admit that the State of Utah is not an active 
partner in the operation of this gravel pit. They admit that 
the State is merely the O\vner and that it lets the premises 
out to its contractors for use in the building of highways. 
Xo, .. ~here in the First Cause of Action do they state that the 
Defendant State of Utah is acting arbitrarily or unreason-
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ably, nor do they state that it is acting without any reason-
able justification for its acts. 
Nuisance as defined in 39 Am. Jur. par. 2, p. 280, states: 
"The nuisance doctrine operates as a restriction upon the right of 
an owner of property to make such use of it as he pleases. In legal 
phraseology the term 'nuisance' is applied to that class of wrongs 
which arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful 
use by a person of his own property and produces such material 
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will 
presume a consequent damage." 
Nowhere in the present situation is there any allegation 
that the State of Utah in utilizing its property is acting un-
reasonably, unwarrantably or unlawfully. Only in their 
second cause of action, wherein the plaintiffs ask for com-
pensatory and punitive damages, do the appellants allege 
that the action of the defendants is negligent and unskillful 
and that the operation is willfully negligent, and in this case 
it is hard to see where or why the State of Utah, acting in 
the capacity of a nominal landlord, could possibly be con-
nected with the management of the property and could be 
held for any negligent or unskillful manner that would 
create the nuisance complained of by the plaintiffs herein. 
It is solely because of these allegations of the negligent 
and unskillful operation of the gravel pit by the Defendant 
Burgraff Construction Company that allows the court to 
retain jurisdiction of the Defendant Construction Com-
pany. If such action is negligent or unskillful, then the con-
tractor does not participate in the sovereign immunity of 
the State. The subject is discussed in 43 Am. Jur., par. 83, 
p. 827, wherein it states: 
" ... injuries necessarily incident to performance of contract; 
nuisances ... as a general rule, a private contractor in the con-
struction of a public improvement under a contract wi~h duly 
authorized public authorities is not liable for any injury, d1rect or 
consequential, to owners of private property that may result as a 
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necessary incident from the prosecution of the work in a proper 
lll.tnner, which would otherwise amount to a nuisance. The theory 
is th;tt one who contract with a public body for the performance of 
public work is entitled to share the immunity of the public body 
from liability for incidental injuries necessarily involved in the 
prcformance of the contract, where he is not guilty of negligence. 
In other words, when the act or failure to act which causes an 
injury is one which the contractor was employed to do, the injury 
n~sults not from a negligent manner of doing the work, but from 
the performance thereof, the contractor is entitled to share the im-
munity from liability which the public enjoys, but he is not entitled 
to the immunity of the public from liability where the injury arises 
from thl' negligent manner of performing the work. Under an 
agreement on his part to be responsible for any damage or injury 
resulting from the performance of the work he may not be held 
liable for results which follow from a performance of the terms 
of the contract." 
It is, therefore, the contention of the Respondent that 
there is nothing in the complaint that would give to the 
court jurisdiction. The court acted correctly in dismissing 
this action against the Defendant, State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Unless appellants allege such facts to show such arbi-
trary and unreasonable causing of damage without reason-
able justification for doing so in the public interest, in a 
manner that imposes a special burden on one not shared by 
the public generally, principles of equity cannot be involved 
and prevent threatened action of such character or to re-
move any instrumentality born of such conduct. (Spring-
~·ille Banking Co. l'. Burton, supra) . 
. \ppellants did not allege or assert anything akin thereto 
that \\·ould take this action from without the general rule 
that a consequential damage cannot be enjoined. 
Further appellants' allegation that they are without 
legal remedy at Ia\\·, is not substantiated by their complaint 
and they in fact allege that they have a legal remedy at la: 
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against Defendant Burgraff Construction Company in their 
Second Cause of Action, and having an adequate remedy 
at law appellants are not entitled to an injunction. (Shaw 
vs. Salt Lake County, supra). The District Court must have 
taken these allegations into consideration in not dismissing 
the complaint against the Defendant Burgraff Construction 
Company, thereby allowing plaintiffs to pursue their legal 
remedy for damages. 
Therefore, the Court acted correctly in dismissing this 
action against the Defendant State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General 
JOSEPHS. KNOWLTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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